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ABSTRACT
This paperconsidersthe likely effect on the automobile industry of a
free trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico. As there are currently
large resthctions on imports into Mexico, one important outcome of a free
trade agreement would be the opening of the Mexican market to U.S.
producers. This is consistent with the history of the international auto industry
and the fact that the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact opened a new, large market to
U.S. manufacturers. The current state of the Mexican auto industry is
considered in great detail, suggesting that the Mexican industry will continue
to prosper, increasing output but also relying heavily on production from U.S.
owned plants and on inputs imported from the U.S. and Canada. However,
much of the existing domestically oriented industry is likely to be replaced by
other North American producers. Finally, an econometric demand analysis
implies that economic growth together with declines in prices to world levels
could rapidly expand the size of the Mexican auto market. The free trade
agreement represents an opportunity for product diversification and
rationalization in the auto industry.
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The recent growth of automotive imports from Mexico and the
prospect of a new North American free trade agreement have raised fears
of a massive movement of North American automobile production to low
wage Mexican plants. In common with many other industry observers, we
argue thatsucha movement is unlikely.' In brief, the primary current
impediments to North American trade in autos consist of restrictions on
imports into Mexico. Thus, the primary long term effect of a free trade
agreement will be the opening of the (potentially large) Mexican market to
North American producers, rather than a movement of production to
Mexico.
We begin with a discussion of the world automobile industry and
of prior experience with free trade in automobiles. We note that the
automotive sector is now a world industry that escapes the narrow limits of
national boundaries. In analyzing the international position of US,
European and Japanese firms, we show that US firms have the greatest
involvement abroad. However, despite the relocation of production across
the world, the ratio between the output of foreign affiliates of US firms and
the domestic output of US firms changed little during the 1980's. During
this same period, the overseas competitors of US firms followed very
different strategies. While Japanese manufacturers demonstrated an
'See also Womack 1991 for a useful discussion of many of the issues
discussed below. While Womack relies heavily on interviews with industry
participants, we rely more on government and trade association data and, in
our final section, on econometric analysis.4
unprecedented willingness and ability to move production abroad, European
companies have retrenched inside the European Community.
To identil5' the consequences of a possible free trade agreement,
we analyze the effects of the Auto Pact of 1965 on both the Canadian and
the US auto industry. We show that the Canadian industry enjoyed
spectacular growth after the Auto Pact, mostly fuelled by exports to the US.
However, the most relevant aspect of this episode for the Mexican case is
that the Auto Pact opened a new, large market to US manufacturers.
Mexico, however, with its very low wages, is clearly a different
case from Canada. We therefore turn to a discussion of the history and
current structure of the Mexican auto industry. We note that this industry
is increasing its integration into the world market and is particularly
integrated into the operations of US manufacturers. Current policies,
however, prohibit most imports of finished automobiles and give indirect
subsidies to exports. Both Mexican exports and imports have been
increasing, with many exports coming from "Maquiladora plants near the
border. We provide new data on Maquiladoras that is consistent with
claims that these plants specialize in labor intensive production unlikely to
take place in the US. We conclude that the export oriented sector of the
Mexican auto industry will continue to prosper, relying heavily on
production from US owned plants and on inputs imported from the US and
Canada. However, much of the existing domestically oriented industry is
likely to be replaced by other North American producers.
Finally, via an econometric demand analysis, we consider the
potential size of the Mexican market that could be opened up to US
producers. This demand analysis treats recent changes in Mexican national
income and government policy as experiments that help to reveal underlying5
demandelasticities. While the Mexican market is currently small, we find
that declines in prices to world levels and, even more importantly,
economic growth, could rapidly expand its size.
H. THE WORLD AUTO MARKET: SOME STYLIZED FACTS.
World-wide Trends. It would be beyond the scope of this paper
to analyze in depth the world-wide evolution of the automobile industry.
However, to put the issue of the free trade agreement in its proper
perspective, it is important to recall some essential features of the
automotive sector. After the 1980-82 recession, world-wide motor-vehicle
production experienced several years of sustained growth. Between 1982
and 1988 motor-vehicle production grew by 33%, and by 1988 it was 13%
higher than the previous peak of 1978.
More importantly, the recent history of the industry is
characterized by increased globalization of both production and markets.
The increasing multinational nature of most car producers makes it difficult
to draw clear national boundaries for the industry. With few exceptions,
auto companies continued to diversify the location of their production in the
1980s. As shown in Figure 1, the major auto companies typically produce
between 10% and 50%oftheir total output abroad. American companies
still exhibit the largest share of production manufactured at foreign
affiliates, but European and Japanese companies have increased their
foreign activity in the last decade. The changes in the location of
production of Japanese companies have been especially remarkable. For6
example, while Honda's production in 1981 took place completely inside
Japan, by 1988 almost a quarter of it took place abroad, mainly in the US.
Typically, changes in the international location of production are guided by
a desire to move manufacturing closer to end markets, thus saving on
transport costs and, more importantly, avoiding local protectionist
measures. With few noticeable exceptions, mentioned below, the bulk of
production at foreign affiliates is not reimported for sale in the home
market.
It is important, therefore, to keep in mind that the relevent
definition of, say, the American auto industry depends on the issue to be
addressed. For example, if we are concerned with the profitability of US
companies, the relevant criterion is the nationality of the manufacturer,
independently of where it operates. On the other hand, if we are concerned
with the effects of the industry on domestic employment and output, what is
important is the production location and not nationality. As shown in
Figure 2(a)-2(d), the two criteria do not always suggest similar conclusions.
Tn 1988, American car manufacturers had the largest share of world
production (34.1%), followed by Japanese (28.8%), and European (24%)
manufacturers. Perhaps surprisingly, Japanese and European Community
shares decreased from 1981, while the American share actually increased.2
If we consider the location of production, the situation is reversed.
The European Community has the largest world share (31.1 %),followedby
Japan (27.7%) and the US (24.4%). Both the European and American
20f course, the increasing share of U.S. production is in largepart a result
of the robust recovery of the U.S.economy over exactly these years. A peak-
to-peak comparison of, for example, 1978-1988, would produce somewhat
different results.7
shares increased from 1981, while the Japanese share fell slightly. A major
cause of this pattern is the relocation of Japanese production from Japan to
the US and Europe.
The US Industry. Data on world-wide employment and foreign
direct investment of US firms are not available at the auto industry level, so
we first analyze data referring to the whole transportation equipment sector.
Between 1983 and 1988, world-wide employment of US multinationals in
transportation equipment increased by 20% (from 2.7 million to 3.2 million
employees). The increase in employment, however, occurred only at US
parents where it rose by 32%. In contrast, the aggregate employment of
foreign affiliates decreased by almost 10% in the same period, although this
employment displayed substantial cross-country variation. As shown in
Figure 3(a)-3(b), employment in European affiliates dropped from 63% to
45%oftotal foreign employment. Conversely, considerable growth took
place in Canada, where employment increased from 111,000 to 137,000
and in Japan, although by a smaller extent. Similarly, the share of
employment in Latin America almost doubled, with Mexico enjoying the
largest growth. Because of this increase, US multinationals in
transportation equipment now employ almost 83,000 in Mexico, comparable
to their Brazilian employment of 89,000.
Similar trends are present in the pattern of the US direct
investment position. After a decline between 1980 and 1983, the US
foreign investment position in transportation equipment increased sharply
and more than doubled between 1984 and 1989 (Figure 4). This period
was characterized by a marked shift away from Europe toward Canada and8
Japan (Figure 5(a)-S(b)).Whilethe direct investment position in Latin
America increased by almost 70% between 1980 and 1989, its world share
decreased, although this decrease largely stems from divestment in
Argentina (Figure 6(a)-6(b)). Both Brazil and Mexico, in fact,
experienceda rapid growth, higher than the world average. In Mexico, as
we will see, this growth is largely due to the expansion of the
maquiladora" sector.
We will now turn from the transportation equipment sector to data
on the automobile industry alone. Between 1981 and 1988, production in
the US automotive industry increased by 42%, a rate of growth greater than
in the European Community (32%) and Japan (13.6%). As shown in
Figure 7(a), foreign manufacturers' production has increased from 2.6% to
8 % of total output. The upward trend in foreign producers' output is
entirely due to the commencement of Japanese production.4 Since 1984,
output of Japanese transplants has been growing at an annual avenge rate
of 55%.Although far from Japanese performance, the US production of
American manufacturers displayed a considerable growth, increasing by
34% between 1981 and 1988. This contrasts with the behavior of European
producers whose output more than halved in the same period, due to the
closure of VW's plant in 1988.
We now turn to the nationality of producing firms. As shown in
Figure 7(b), world-wide production of American manufacturers increased
by 34.5% between 1981 and 1988. The figure also shows that the increase
3Once again, this is influenced by cyclical factors.
4Honda started its US operations in 1982, and was soon followed by
Nissan (1983), Toyota (1986) and Mazda (1987) and Subaru-Isuzu (1989).9
in production was a global phenomenon.3 The largest increases took place
in Canada (43.5%) and in the European Community (39%). To a lesser
extent, production also increased in Latin America (21.7%).
In summary, it is important to stress that American foreign
investment and production in transportation equipment is quite considerable.
In 1988, more than 37% of the American production of motor-vehicles took
place abroad. This ratio remained almost constant during the eighties,
despite the considerable changes in the degree of involvement of American
manufacturers across different world regions. In comparison, the production
of foreign companies in the US is small, but increased sharply in the
eighties, mainly because of the operations of Japanese transplants.
The European Community, Japan, and Latin America. The
situation in the European Community is almost opposite from the US. The
production of foreign manufacturers in the Community is large, a quarter of
total production in 1988, up from 22.5% in 1981 (Figure 8(a)). European
production in the US decreased by almost 60%, between 1981 and 1988.
In contrast, US production in the European Community increased by 39%,
well above the 28% growth rate of the European manufacturers. Japanese
companies have also begun production in the Community, a process started
with Nissan's factories in Spain (1983) and the UK (1988). Japanese
production in Europe, however, is less than one sixth of their production in
the US. In contrast to their American counterparts, European
manufacturers produce relatively little outside the Community and such
5Only in Australia (included under 'others) did American automobile
output decrease in this period.10
production decreased in the eighties from 10.2% in 1981 to 7.4% in 1988
(Figure 8(b)). The only sizable foreign production takes place in Latin
America, mainly because of the VW and FIAT plants in Brazil and VW's
operation in Mexico. It should be kept in mind, however, that a substantial
part of the production of European manufacturers occurs within the
Community but in countries other than the country of residence of the
parent company. Also, this production diversification within the
Community showed an upward trend in the eighties, increasing from 9.2%
in 1981 to 12% in 1988.
Until the early eighties, Japanese automobile production was
isolated from the rest of the world. No foreign production of motor
vehicles took place in Japan, and virtually all of Japanese manufacturers'
output was produced in Japan. While foreign producers have not
established a noticeable presence in Japan, Japanese manufacturers have
shifted their production abroad at an increasing rate. Between 1981 and
1989 they opened new fronts in the US, Canada, the European Community
and Australia, while increasing their production in Latin America by almost
40%. In 1988 production of foreign affiliates represented 8.6% of total
production, higher than that of the European Community (Figure 9).
In section 3, we analyze in detail the recent evolution of the
automobile sector in Mexico. It is worthwhile, however, to put the
Mexican case in the wider context of the Latin American market. While
some assembly plants operate in Columbia, Chile, Pen and Venezuela, the
bulk of the Latin American production takes place in Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico. As shown in Figure 10(a)-10(b), Brazil is the largest producer,
manufacturing in 1988 over 60% of Latin American motor-vehicles.
Brazilian share of Latin American production has increased considerably in11
the eighties, while the opposite was true for both Mexico and Argentina. In
fact, between 1981 and 1988, production in Brazil increased by 37%, while
in Argentina it decreased by 6% and in Mexico it decreased by 4.5%.
However, while production in Argentina never recovered from the
contraction of the early eighties, Mexican production has displayed a
positive trend since 1983, with particularly significant gains in the most
recent years. By 1988, US manufacturers were the largest producers in
Latin America, with 45.8% of total output. European Community
producers, which had the largest share up to 1987, decreased to 43.8%
from 50.4% in 1981. Looking across countries in Latin America, in 1988
US companies produced the majority of motor-vehicles in Mexico (68 %j,
while Japanese companies produced 20% and European companies 12%. In
Argentina and Brazil, however, European manufacturers still had the lead in
1988, with 59% and 41.8% of total production respectively. That year, US
companies produced only 39% of Brazil's output and 19.8% of Argentina's
output.
One crucial issue in view of a possible trade liberalization is the
current degree of openness of the sector in Latin America, especially in
Mexico. All three countries under consideration have a high degree of
protection against foreign-produced autos and consequently imports have
remained negligible. As shown in Figure 11(a)-11(b), Argentina's
production is almost completely absorbed by the domestic market and
exports have been very small. However, both Mexicanand Brazilian
export patterns have changed dramatically in recent years.While in 1970
exports represented less than 1 % of Brazilian production, theyincreased to
13% in 1980 and 30% in 1988 (Figure 12(a)). While most exports are
directed to other Latin American countries and Europe, about 20% of12
exports were shipped to the US in 1988 (Figure 12(b)). We will analyze
the Mexican case in more detail in the next section. At this point,
however, it is worth mentioning that Mexican exports increased by a factor
of 10 in the eighties. Moreover, 86% of exports were directed to the US in
1990 (Figure 13(a)-13(b)).
These developments in Latin America raise the central issue of
whether a free trade agreement with Mexico will induce American firms to
relocate across the southern border, in an attempt to reduce their production
costs. Some useful information in debating this issue can be derived by
analyzing the recent history of the trade relationship between Canada and
the US. We turn to this issue next.
The Canadian-US Auto Pact. Looking at the recent history of
the US-Canada market is instructive for several reasons. First, the type of
free trade agreement now negotiated between Mexico and the US hasmany
points in common with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed in 1989
between Canada and the US. Moreover, it is most likely that a Mexico-US
agreement would not even be an issue now without the successful
conclusion of the previous Canada-US negotiations. Second, the common
geographical proximity to the US makes several aspects of the Canadian
experience relevant to understand the likely consequences of a free trade
area with Mexico. Finally, there are unavoidable interactions and spillovers
between trade relationships north and south of the US border. The
Canadian experience, however, should be interpreted with caution since
there are obvious differences between the Canadian and Mexican cases.
Probably the most important difference is the dissimilar stage of economic13
development in which the two countries are entering the free trade area.
Later in the paper, we will argue that the particular growth position of
Mexico is an essential element in evaluating the medium-long run
consequences of a free trade agreement.
The relevant episode for our purposes is not, however, the Canada-
US FTA of 1989, but the Canada-US Auto Pact of 1965. The F1'A, in
fact, has not changed the basic car industry environment created by the
1965 Pact. Compared with the scope of the 1965 Auto Pact, the FTA
introduces only minor modifications. It calls for the phasing out (to be
completed by 1998) of the remaining duties on Canada-US automotive
trade, and it changes the procedure for computing the North American
content requirement (now 50% of direct manufacturing costs instead of 60%
of invoice value). More important is the provision that prevents new
manufacturers from enjoying the privilege of free trade import into Canada
from third countries.
The 1965 Auto Pact eliminated most of the tariffs between the US
and Canada. The Auto Pact also introduced the 50% minimum North
American requirement for products flowing from Canada to the US, as
mentioned above. Canada took a more global approach to trade
liberalization than the US, granting free entry to all imports (not just from
the US) as long as they satisfied a number of production safeguards. These
safeguards were designed to guarantee a minimum ratio of Canadian
production to total Canadian sales and value added.
The effects of the Pact on the Canadian Auto industry were
enormous. Production more than doubled between 1965 and 1970, and
almost tripled by 1979 (Figure 14(a)). Most of the increase in production
has been exported, mainly to the US. As shown in Figure 15(a), before the14
AutoPact Canadian exports were negligible and were mostly directed to
countries other than the US. The Pact changed the situation dramatically.
By 1970, over 70% of Canadian production was exported to the US (Figure
15(b)). Importantly, however, trade has not been one-sided. As shown in
Figure 14(b), before 1965 Canadian imports of motor-vehicles were small
and came primarily from outside North America. After the Auto Pact,
imports increased sharply, mainly because of the acceleration of imports
from the US. While, prior to 1965 US imports represented around 5% of
Canadian sales, by 1971 this ratio surpassed 40% and it is now over 50%
(Figure 16(a)). Exports to Canada represented less than 1 % of US
production before 1965 and are now over 7% (Figure 16(b)).
The Auto Pact thus profoundly changed the Canadian auto
industry. Production rose spectacularly and a major component of this
surge in production was exported to the US. But the most important lesson
for the US-Mexican trade agreement is that the Auto Pact created anew,
large market for US manufacturers. In the next section we will consider
the Mexican auto market in greater detail. We will then turn, in section, to
the potential size of this market under a free tradeagreement.
ifi. THE MEXICAN AUTO INDUSTRY IN RELATION TO THE
UNITED STATES.
In this section, we will analyze in some detail the history and
current structure of the Mexican automobile industry. We will emphasize
that,despiteyears of avowedly protectionist policies, the Mexican industry
is dominated by foreign producers and has remaineda large importer from15
the US In considering the current structure of the industry based in
Mexico, we will show that Mexican auto exports to the US are concentrated
in products typically imported by the US from low wage countries. But in
contrast to similar products imported from overseas, the Mexican products
are frequently manufactured by US based firms and contain a high
percentage of US made parts.
The Initial Relationship. The automobile industry represents one
of the most important examples of industrial integration between the US and
Mexico. The multiple backward and forward linkages of automobile
manufacturing have captured the attention of both governments in the last
three decades, and the relationship has been influenced by world trends and
country-specific regulations on both sides of the border. In this section, we
will look at the series of Mexican 'Automobile Decrees" as a mechanism to
promote sectoral growth and, more importantly, as a response to the
overwhelming automobile trade deficits since the 1950's.
The growing Mexican market led Ford to open the first Mexican
assembly plant in 1925. Tn the following years, all the other US producers
as well as some foreign and domestic firms started assembling vehicles.
Nevertheless, by 1960, 53 % of domestic demand for passenger cars was
still supplied by imports, while close to 80 percent of the value of parts
used in domestic assembly was also imported. Exports amounted to a little
over $200,000, producing a sectoral deficit of more than $119 million,
almost 85% with the US alone (Table 1).
These facts motivated the Mexican government's 1962 Automotive
Decree, establishing a new regulatory framework intended to foster16
domestic production and reduce the trade deficit. Other countries (such as
Brazil and Argentina) employed protectionist policies, but because of its
links with the US industry, Mexico's rules were far less restrictive. The
decree included a 60% domestic content regulation, price controls and
production quotas. Foreign investors faced no restrictions in vehicle
production, but were limited to 40% ownership of component plants.
The government envisioned an industry consisting of only four
domestically owned companies. However, in 1964 the final outcome
allowed 7 producers: General Motors, Ford, American Motors, Fabricas
Automex (with Chrysler participation), Nissan, Volkswagen and DINA, a
government-owned firm.
US-Mexican sectoral relations continued to deepen. To meet the
domestic content requirement, US subsidiaries, led by Ford, linked US
component producers with Mexican capital to create auto part companies.
Tremec and Spicer are the result of these efforts, supplying most of the
domestic market for transmissions (and several other components) since
then.OtherUS-based pasts companies like Eaton made substantial direct
investments in the components industry.
Nonetheless, the sector's significant trade imbalance persisted; in
1970 the deficit with the US alone represented $170 million dollars or close
to 17% of the nation's 1970 trade deficit. After numerous disputes between
domestic and foreign producers, the government opted for an export
promotion policy formalized in the 1972 automotive decree. Imports were
to be balanced by growing exports containing at least 40% of auto parts not
made by the car manufacturer. This policy strongly favored foreign auto
makers. Automex faced Chrysler's opposition to its US exports, leading to17
financial difficulties and acquisition by its US partner.6
Private domestic (i.e. Mexican) capital in vehicle production
disappeared. Exports of auto parts increased as the Big Three implemented
globalization strategies, but the deficit persisted. In 1975, imports from the
US were almost three times larger than exports from Mexico (figure 17.)
The 1977 Auto Decree created a new balance-of-payments
mechanism, requiring each auto maker to increase exports in order to
balance its imports and payments abroad by 1982. This provided an
additional incentive for multinationals, especially the Big Three, to focus on
Mexican export strategies instead of investing in other developing countries
like Brazil. By 1981, General Motors increased its "maquiladora"
operations (discussed further below), and opened two new plants for the
production of engines and vehicles. Chrysler also started engine production
operations, joined by Ford's Chihuahua plant two years later (Table 2).
The growth of auto parts companies, supplying the rapidly growing
domestic market with high quality components, was the outcome of a
second wave of joint ventures between US auto makers and large Mexican
industrial groups. Tn 1981, Ford joined with Grupo Alfa to open Nemak,
still one of the largest suppliers of aluminum engine heads. A few months
later, General Motors and Grupo Condumex together created Condumex
Autoparts, supplying wire harnesses. Two other Ford ventures with Orupo
Vitro and Grupo Visa created Vitroflex, the largest auto glass producer, and
Carplastic, producing plastic boards. The multinational auto makers
benefitted in several ways from such associations. They could produce and
6For a good description of the negotiation process between manufacturers
and the Mexican government consult Bennet and Sharpe (1985).18
supply the domestic market with higher quality products, profit from the
comparative advantage of their Mexican partners, meet export
requirements, and even source their US based plants, reducing production
costs.
The 1977 decree also increased maquiladora incentives allowing up
to 20% of the compensating exports of car producers to accrue through the
value added of maquila plants. US auto makers, and in particular General
Motors, increased their involvement in this sector with electrical
components assembly.
The significant growth of the domestic market, peaking at 600,000
units in 1981, also entailed the worsening of the sector's trade balance and
made it impossible for producers to meet the "balanced-growth" goal of
1977. In 1981, the auto deficit with the US alone was close to 27% of
Mexico's total trade deficit (Table 1).
The 1983 Auto Decree followed shortly, undertaking stronger
measures aimed at a zero trade balance for each company. Three main
policies were outlined: stringent domestic content rules for vehicles and
parts, required balance-of-payments (allowing no deficits), and limits to one
line and a maximum of five models per car maker by 1987. The more
restrictive rules and a decline in the domestic market convinced Renault and
American Motors to stop vehicle production.' The Big Three, Volkswagen
and Nissan, all 100% foreign owned, are the sole remainders of 20years of
"protectionist? policies in the passenger car segment.
7See Lopez-de-Silanes (1991) for a more detailed analysis of thepast
Automotive Decrees and their effects on the Mexican industry.19
The 1989 Auto Decree. We will now turn to the recent evolution
of the Mexican auto industry and its integration with the US. We will
begin by explaining the present regulatory framework in Mexico, which has
not only altered the tone and thrust of the previous two decades of industrial
policies, but also led to an enormous increase in imports ending the period
of sectoral trade surplus.
By 1989, Mexico was already embarked on a path of stabilization,
trade liberalization and structural change, but the automotive industry
remained isolated from these movements, ranking third in protection after
oil and tobacco. To find a solution to this imbalance, all industry players
were involved in consultations, resulting in three 1989 Decrees designed to
promote the industry's development in both domestic and foreign markets.
The Mexican automobile market is almost 1/25thofthe US size,
and the ratio of cars per consumer is eleven times lower in Mexico. These
issues were addressed in the 1989 "Auto Popular" Decree. Tax exemptions
were granted to popular cars subscribing to the program, which required
the auto maker to reduce its profit margin as well. The general idea was to
provide consumers with a small car at more reasonable prices. Only the
Volkswagen Sedan model (the "Beetle) embraced the scheme. By the end
of that year, VW had become the leader in domestic sales with a 70%
increase in the Sedan's production and sales. In 1990, monthly sales of this
car had quadrupled, capturing 24% of total passenger car sales in the
country.
In December, two other decrees followed. One pertaining to
buses, trucks and other similar vehicles established, for the first time since
1962, a clear path for the elimination of trade and entry bathers (to be20
achieved by 1994.) Finally, new rules pertaining to the manufacturing of
passenger vehicles and light trucks were outlined in a third decree that
significantly relaxed the restrictions on foreign-owned producers and broke
with a closed market for imports. The third decree became effective in
November, 1990 with the 1991 year models.
Auto makers established by 1989 now have some freedom to
choose the lines they wish to produce in Mexico and those to import from
the same manufacturer abroad. However, imports of vehicles are restricted
to 15% of total domestic production (this increases to 20% in 1993.) To
gain permission to import, manufacturers must still maintain a positive trade
balance, with diminishing proportions of exports to imports. Auto parts
imports continue to be open to trade with an avenge tariff rate close to 10
percent.
Individual automobile, truck, and auto parts domestic content
requirements have been eliminated. A more flexible 36 % of the National
Value Added for all the auto makers' production must still come from the
National Value Added of the domestic auto parts industry, or from other
domestic suppliers.8 The general deregulation of the sector includes the
elimination of: limits in lines and models, the compulsory list of domestic
autoparts to be included in each vehicle, the mandatory gasoline engines on
medium-sized trucks, and the restrictions on the proportion of base vehicles
marketed.
The previous balance-of-payments requirement was replaced by a
8This constitutes a significant change since theprevious 60% content rule
was measured at production costs. Further discussion of this issue is also
found in Lopez-de-Silanes (1991).21
less restrictive trade-balance mechanism eliminating the need tocompensate
for payments abroad. Trade surpluses can accumulate beginning with the
1992 car model year. Even the transferability of trade-surplus rightsamong
manufacturers is allowed.
The pricing of imported vehicles is said to be closely watched by
the authorities. A manufacturer could lose its temporary "import
exclusivity rights" if its listed price exceeds international public prices for
equivalent vehicles.
Resulting Industry Structure. Today's Mexican automotive
industry is the result of regulations in the series of decrees just outlined, the
macroeconomic conditions of the country in the 1980's and intense
international market competition. These three factors have created a two-
tiered industry and, until recently, defined separate trends for domestic
sales and exports.
An important reason for the failure of the 1969-1982 measures in
promoting exports was the stream of incentives favoring the opposite:
production for the domestic market. This has created a relatively inefficient
domestic assembly industry, which frequently relies on outdated production
techniques and short production runs. This industry is unlikely to survive a
free-trade agreement in its present form.
Trade liberalization measures starting in 1983 have eliminated
some of the anti-export bias; indeed the strict balance-of-payments rules can
be seen as an implicit export subsidy. The US auto manufacturers, as well
as some large component companies, are among the most favored by the
implementation of special export programs. The new, globally oriented22
sector of the Mexican auto industry is likely to flourish under a free-trade
pact. This industry, typically located in Northern Mexico to take advantage
of its close links with the US, can be roughly divided into three parts:
engine plants, Maquila auto parts plants and a high-tech auto assembly
sector. We will examine these sectors in some detail, arguing that exports
to the US from this sector largely compete with imports from other (often
low wage) countries, rather than with US production. The North American
industry is aided by the relatively low-cost and high quality of the Mexican
products and (perhaps more importantly to US and Canadian producers) the
Mexican exporters are large demanders of inputs from the rest of North
America.
Of the three sectors, production in the engine and high-tech
assembly plants most resembles similar US based production. However,
production in the famed Maquiladora sector is concentrated in highly labor
intensive stages of production. This sector takes US inputs and creates
products which would otherwise might othetwise be produced in other areas
of the world.
A detailed analysis of the manufacturers' installed capacity per
plant is provided in Table 2. We show the data for 1983 and 1988,
covering the period of one of the most important investment waves in the
industry. Installed capacity and announced investment plans with their
possible consequences for exports are also shown. After reviewing the
various export-oriented sectors, we will turn to a discussion of the prospects
for the domestically oriented industry.23
The Engine Plants. The engine export take-off in 1982-1984
marks a first stage in the export movement. Triggered by the intense
competition from Japanese imports, US producers searched for low-cost
production bases in Third World countries. The new market for smaller
engines and front-wheel drives was reoriented to these countries, among
which Mexico presented appropriate cost-saving conditions for engine
production. In 1981, General Motors and Chrysler opened new high-
technology engine plants in Saltillo, significantly increasing their installed
capacity to 570,000and395,000unitsrespectively. Ford's 1983 Chihuahua
plant uses advanced technology and a skilled labor force. The engines
produced in this plant have quality comparable to US manufactured engines
and require similar labor input. Another example of the quality and high
productivity of this segment is Renault's engine plant in Center-North
Mexico. Renault's Mexican operations, after withdrawing from the
passenger car market in 1986, consist solely of an engine plant in Torreon
producing nearly 150,000 units per year; this plant produces some of the
best quality engines of the French manufacturer.
Total engine exports quadrupled in value in two years and reached
over 1.4 million units by 1988. Practically all of the Big Three exports are
directed to the US. Nevertheless, they still constitute less than 14% of the
total amount of engines used every year in the US based production. The
satisfactory results of these plants in world markets has led Ford to
announce increased investments to double its capacity in its Chihuahua
engine operations (Table 2).24
High Tech Vehicle Plants. The second stage in export growth
began in 1987 with the high-tech vehicle plants. Ford's Hermosillo plant,
one of the most advanced in the world, became operational that year and
was to annually assemble, largely from Japanese parts, 130,000 units of
Mercury Tracers for export to the US. However, due to the appreciation of
the yen the units became more expensive than expected, halving actual
production to 65,000 per year. Originally, about 65% of components were
Japanese, 3 % from the US and 32% Mexican, but with time the input
composition has dramatically changed. The 1990 model contained nearly
75% Us parts, 15% from Japan and only 5% from Mexico. In this new
phase, after a partial shutdown of the plant in 1989 that nearly halved
exports, the new Ford-Mazda Escort model is being produced with exports
reaching over 40,000 units in 1990.
Exports from General Motors since 1986 have been erratic, with
total units fluctuating between 20,000 and 40,000. Chrysler's vehicle
exports include an almost constant 22,000 units of the D-150 light truck
and, until 1989, mostly compact K-models. More recently, Volkswagen's
shutdown in the US (due to reduced demand) resulted in its operational shift
to Mexico, thus creating a flow of small car exports to the US. Finally,
Nissan's exports, steadily growing since 1987, are almost completely
directed to other Latin American countries.
In summary, total vehicle units exported jumped from 20,000 in
1983 to 278,000 seven years later. Tn 1983, Volkswagen was responsible
for 90% of exports and only 1 % of vehicles was directed to North
America, while in 1990 86% were sent to the US alone. Of these, 87 %
represented exports of the Big Three back home (Table 3).25
Maquiladoras andAutoparts.The maquiladoras ("in-bond"
plants) are another recent component of North American automobile
integration, exempli1'ing a cost-efficient combination of inputs between the
two countries. The basic operation of a maquila plant consists of the
import of components and assembly in Mexico for later export. These
plants are exempt from Mexican majority ownership rules governing the
auto parts industry, and are able to import components free from duties as
long as they export at least 80% of their output.
These plants have experienced dynamic growth in the past decade,
especially since 1984. From about 12,000 workers in 1982, transportation
equipment maquiladoras employed about 100,000 workers in 1990. That
year, their total value added represented an average of 23 % of exported
value and had multiplied seven fold since 1982. Automotive inaquiladoras
are the second most important maquila group following electronic materials
and accessories. They contribute 1 out of 5workersin the total
maquiladora operations located in Mexico (Fable 4).
In order to clarify the sometimes misrepresented nature of this
industry, we will study a sample of 178 maquiladora plants out of the total
of 187 transportation plants in May 1991 (Fable 5).Becauseof the paucity
of available data on the maquiladoras, we provide fairly detailed
information about these plants. Our results show that one out of four of
these plants is engaged in the production of wire harnesses, an extremely
labor intensive activity. In 1990, Mexico was the most important exporter
to the US of this product, followed by Taiwan and the Philippines.
Japanese data also show large imports of these products into Japan from26
otherAsian countrieslikeTaiwan.From our data, almost all components
used in Mexican wire harness plants are imported from the US,
representing close to 70% of Total Production Value. Presumably, the
proportion of US made components is much less in east Asian production.
Seat covers and interior trim constitute another 8 % of maquiladora
plants. Chromizing and shining of rims takes 5percent,followed by
various other components. Mexico is the main supplier to the US of seats,
safety belts and windshield wipers. All of these operations are labor
intensive; lower Mexican wages are obviously of great benefit to US
producers. Japan similarly uses neighboring Taiwan and Singapore, and
more recently Thailand, for producing such components.9 If US producers
were denied access to the Mexican labor market for these production
stages, they would be at a disadvantage relative to Japanese access to
neighboring low wage countries. (Presently, European producers may gain
similar access to labor markets in Eastern Europe.)
To explore this issue further, we looked at the US Import Tariff by
item from 1982 until 1990, covering the period of the Mexican automotive
export surge. We chose a sample of 17 of the highest US imports from
Mexico, which are almost completely supplied by maquiladoras)° Table 6
presents the participation of Mexican imports in total US imports as well as
9Data is from United Nations trade statistics.
'°Most of these products were chosen from the Automotive products
chapter in the US Tariff Schedule (Chapter 87). Nonetheless, we also looked
at all those products which are identifiable as pertaining for the mostpart to
the automobile sector but find themselves classified in otherchapters of the
Tariff Schedule. We included some of these items since several of them
constitute a large part of US imports from Mexico.27
Mexico's ranking among exporters to the US in each product analyzed.
Similarly we also show the percentage of US imports coming from the first,
second or third countries in the ranking. In 9 of the products analyzed
imports from Mexico rank lower than those from Japan, Taiwan, Korea or
Hong Kong among others. These other countries constitute a high
percentage of the US import bill in these items. As noted, a difference may
be found in the US content of imports from such nations versus imports
from Mexico.
Our study also shows that 65% of the plants have US ownership of
more than 90% of capital, and 10 more constitute US-Mexican joint
ventures with Mexican participation below 50% (Table 5). Only 8 plants in
the sample have ownership interests from other countries, half of these with
Japanese participation. The maquiladoras are thus in large part a US
operation, sourcing components with large US inputs for North-American
based plants.
For a total of 36 maquiladoras we obtained more detailed data.
Our criterion for this sample included choosing all the operations of the Big
Three, and all other producers with non-US capital in their structure
(excluding Mexico). General Motors is the assembler most involved in
maquiladoras, employing close to 38 thousand workers. Wire harnesses
represent most of its plants; it also engages in other activities of
maquiladoras as described above. Ford's and Chrysler's participation is
sigthficantly smaller (Table 7).
With the exception of Honda's plant, Mexican components
represent at most 4.8% of production value with a mean of 0.3 percent.
The total Mexican value added in this sample constituted on average 22%
of total production value. The Big Three employ a total of 5300 workers in28
all their analyzed maquiladora operations. For this sample of US auto
makers, close to 80% of total production value is represented by imported
materials, while Mexican components represent less than 1 percent. The
wage bill is about 10% of the total value of production. This is relatively
good news for US labor, given that these ratios would differ significantly in
overseas operations.
OtherUScomponent imports from the Mexican auto parts industry
outside the maquiladora sector have shown significant growth but their
future is not certain, at least in their present condition. Between 1982 and
1989, auto parts exports multiplied five times in value. North America
represented nearly 80% of total Mexican auto part exports in 1990, but the
Mexican share of total US imports trails the share of several other
countries. Parts exports are concentrated among a small number of
companies and include very labor-intensive products and those in which
Mexico has some other competitive advantage. There is an absence of
firms exporting high-technology parts, and a lack of international
competitiveness in medium-technology parts. It seems that most of these
exports constitute low-technology products.
To further explore this issue we undertook the same type of
analysis as with the maquiladoras looking at highly exported Mexican
autoparts in the US Import Tariff (Table 8). We can confirm the above
observations. With the exception of safety glass, Mexican imports
represent around 5%ofUS total imports. Mexico ranks significantly lower
than Japan or Canada for most of these. Absent further foreign investment
in the autoparts industry, most of the autoparts sector which produces for
the domestic Mexican market is likely to be replaced by imports from the
US29
Prospect.s for the Domestic Market. The oil bonanza period
between 1977 and 1981 significantly benefitted the Mexican automobile
production. Passenger car production grew at an avenge of 25% per year.
Total vehicle production peaked in 1981 at close to 600,000 units, with
automotive GDP representing 7.1 % of total manufacturing GDP.
Nonetheless, as in the previous 20 years, increased production was tied to
higher imports and a sectoral trade deficit which in 1981 explained close to
40% of the national deficit. The period of high inflation and fall in per
capita real income until 1988 seriously affected the domestic market. From
1981 to 1983, total passenger car sales dropped 43 percent. A slight
recovery in the following two years was followed by two worse years,
leaving domestic passenger car sales at a ten-year low of 154,152 units in
1987.
The stabilization of the economy since 1988 and special policy
measures, such as the "Auto Popular" Decree and certain price controls,
have created a significant recovery in domestic sales, more than doubling
the 1987 sales figure with 352,608 passenger cars and 550,000 vehicles in
1990. This year was the third in a row with a growth rate above 30
percent.
Automotive imports closely followed the production swings of the
1980's, reflecting domestic sales and exports (Figures 13 & 17).
Nonetheless, the introduction of the less restrictive automotive decrees in
1989 marked the end of six years of trade suiplus in this sector. The
partial deregulation and increased openness of the auto industry made
imports of components alone jump from $1.7 billion in 1988 to $4.6 billion30
two years later. The data seems to suggest a fragile trade surplus and an
inevitable dependence on imports of components for both exports and the
growing domestic market.
Although Mexican nominal imports have somewhat changed over
time, we see an almost constant proportion of imports from the United
States. Comparing the import structures of 1982 and 1990 we find a
nonsignificant variation of proportion of materials used in the production of
autoparts, engine components, and autoparts themselves. Ml of these
numbers are above 70% (Table 9).
As for passenger car imports themselves, manufacturers have been
mostly importing luxury cars during this period of adjustment (Table 3).
Partial explanations are the actual limits on the amount of imports, and the
higher profit margin obtainable from these cars, which would otherwise not
be produced in the country in such short runs. In 1990, the Big Three
accounted for 68% of the imported units sold, equivalent to 88% in value.
However, in thinking about these numbers, we should consider possible
uncertainties about the final terms of the Free Trade Agreement and the fact
that the period of observation is still very short in relation to production
decisions.
The likely bright future of the export-oriented sector is not shared
by the rest of the parts and vehicle plants in Mexico. These plants are the
result of decades of import-substitution policies, oligopolistic protection and
restricted entry conditions, all of which impeded technological progress.
These vehicle assembly plants operate in very short runs, far below world
scale (around 250,000 units), aiming at a small closed market with scarce
opportunities for competition. Levels of technology are low, there is little
use of robotics and antiquated equipment dominates the environment. The31
organization of production and labor-management relations are far from
current lean production techniques or their closest equivalents in non-
Japanese firms".
Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons which include Volkswagen's
shutdown and the strategic decisions of US producers responding to some
changes in demand, these plants have exported some models in recent
years. Contrary to expectations, some plants have achieved higher
productivity and quality performance levels than similar plants in other
developing countries. It is nonetheless clear that the arrival of a free trade
area will create extraordinary pressure on these plants, which will need to
undergo substantial restructuring in order to remain open. Among several
possibilities is the specialization of some of them on particular models
which are produced in small runs, due to their own characteristics or to
market demand conditions. This may be happening already, with some
luxury models produced and exported in 1990 (Table 3). Substantial
growth and enlargement of the plants is another option. This is unlikely, as
it would entail the modernization of the whole infrastructure of the plant
when their location near Mexico City in the geographical center of the
country makes exports more difficult.
lv. The Potential Demand for Automobiles in Mexico.
The Mexican export boom discussed above is made possible by the
relatively open US economy. Since the trade barriers to Mexican autos
"An analysis of current production processes and techniques is provided
in Altschuler et.al. (1985).32
entering the XIS are small, while the barriers to US finished vehicle exports
to Mexico are large, the opening of the Mexican auto market to US
producers will be one of the largest effects of a free-trade agreement. The
inefficient operations of the traditional plants in the center of Mexico
suggest that the "new" Mexican market will be largely served by existing
plants in the rest of North America.
In tlis section we consider the potential size of the Mexican market
by examining the current demand for automobiles in Mexico. We estimate
a simple demand system, depending on prices and national income, for
various types of autos in Mexico. The estimated model parameters allow
us to predict the demand for autos in Mexico as prices fall and as income
rises under a free-trade agreement. While the current size of the Mexican
market is small, our parameters are consistent with a prediction that a fall
in prices to world levels, together with a rise in national income, will
produce a substantial increase in Mexican auto demand. If the free-trade
agreement is restricted to North American producers, then this substantially
increased market will be an important source of revenues for these firms.
The partial equilibrium approach of this section contrasts with the
related general equilibrium work of Hunter, Markusen and Rutherford
(1991). That paper attempts to solve out for all of the equilibrium
responses to a free trade agreement, including new demand levels, output
prices, input choices and industry wages. Such an ambitious undertaking
necessitates heroic assumptions on the nature of production and demand.
Also, the parameters of that model are selected by a combination of
arbitrary guesses and calibration to a very small amount of data. For
example, the authors treat all automobiles as a homogeneous good and
assume a constant demand elasticity equal to one.33
Our approach is strictly partial equilibrium, but we allow for
product differentiation and provide econometric estimates of demand
elasticities. The econometric approach provides a clear path from the data
to the results and allows us to calculate standard errors for model
parameters and for projected demand. Rather than attempt to solve out for
new equilibrium outcomes, we provide a series of projections for Mexican
automobile demand under alternative hypotheses about post free trade prices
and growth in income. The approach of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1991) could be used to extend to partial equilibrium approach of this paper
to include a much richer model of product differentiation and an explicit
calculation of new (partial) equilibrium outcomes under free trade.
The data for our analysis are constructed from a monthly series of
product-level prices and sales for the eleven year period 1980-1990. These
data were kindly made available to us by the Mexican automobile dealers
association. The Mexican auto dealers group their autos into four
categories, "popular (which at the end of 1990 includes the Volkswagen
beetle and a local version of the Nissan Sentra), "compacts (which includes
the VW Jetta and Ford Topaz), 'sports" (such as the Ford Thunderbird)
and "large" (or "luxuzy" which includes the Ford Taurus, (3M Century and
Chrysler New Yorker, but no US style luxury cars such as Cadillac or
Mercedes.) As mentioned above, until 1990 Mexican law required that all
of these automobiles be produced in Mexico, and only very limited imports
are now allowed.
For the purposes of this study, we have aggregated the product-
level monthly data into quarterly data on three product groups: popular,
compact and a combined "luxury" category, including both large and sporty
cars. We combined the two more expensive types of cars because of the34
relatively small sales and sporadic production of the sporty models. For
1990, average prices (in US dollars at 1990 exchange rates) and unit sales
of these three types of cars are as follows (note that these sales figures




Relative to the US, these figures are notable for the high level of prices and
for the extremely low level of demand (about 0.34% in annualper capita
auto sales.) Both of these factors suggest the potential for a much larger
market under free trade.
To consider this potential market, we suppose that the demand for
autos of a particular type depends on the avenge prices in the three classes,
on national income, and on the prices of alternative uses of income. We
posit two broad alternative uses of income: savings and the consumption of
other goods. Other goods are treated as the numeraire, as prices are
adjusted for the Mexican consumer price index (CPI). We include as the
"price" of savings the real rate of interest on three month Mexican treasury
bills (RATE). National income is proxied by Gross Domestic Product
(GDP.)
Estimates of Demand. As a particular functional form for
demand, we adopt a constant elasticity framework in which the demand for
product typej at time t, q1,dependson the prices of all the product types,35
Pit'and on aggregate demand factors, x :
ln(q3)=xfl+ Eknlkln(pkl)+ c, (1)
where 7is the elasticity of demand for product jwithrespect to the price
of product k and e represents unobserved demand factors which are
assumed to be uncorrelated with x.Consistentwith the discussion of the
last paragraph, the terms included in x are a constant, the logarithm of real
quarterly GDP (indexed with 1980 CDP equal to 100) and the real three
month T-bill rate. Over the course of the sample, the GDP index varies
from 96.3to128.5 with a mean of 109.8.
Table 10 presents OLS estimates of the parameters in (1) for each
of the product classes, with the cross-price elasticities all constrained to be
zero. These results are consistent with priors, in that an increase in GDP is
associated with increases in demand, while increases in interest rates and
prices appear to decrease demand. For each product class, price elasticities
of demand are estimated to be either inelastic or approximately unit elastic.
However, these OLS estimates ignore the time-series nature of the data, the
effect of cross-price elasticities and the correlation of prices with the
unobserved demand characteristics, e. This latter feature of the data will
tend to bias our results in the direction of inelastic demands.
Instrumental variables methods are the well-known solution to the
correlation of prices with demand errors. The choice of instruments
describes the "experiments" which reveal movements along a given demand
curve; a question naturally arises as to the availability of such instruments.
Luckily for our econometric analysis, in the 1980's the Mexican
government itself conducted a sequence of "experiments" (or policy
changes) which altered input prices and competition in the auto industry.
We take variables proxying for these experiments as our instruments.37
instruments described above.) Our estimation method requires no further
assumptions on the properties of the unobservables, such as
homoskedasticity or assumptions on the correlation of the errors across
product types at a given time.
Estimating the demand system with an unrestricted matrix of price
elasticities yields very imprecise estimates of the elasticities. Table 11
provides a set of estimates which impose symmetry on the matrix of
elasticities and constrain the cross-price elasticities between luxury autos
and other autos to be zero. This restriction is not rejected by the data and,
given that some restrictions are necessary for precise estimates, appears
relatively reasonable. These estimates indicate once again that demand
increases in GDP and decreases as interest rates raise. A one percent
increase in GDP is associated with a greater than three percent demand
increase for each product type. The estimated own-price elasticities are
negative, as required, and are significantly different from zero. In contrast
to the OLS results, the estimates imply elastic demands for each product
type. The large value of the own-price elasticity for 'populaC cars is
consistent with the large sales response to recent price cuts for the
Volkswagen Beetle, as discussed above. The estimated cross-price
elasticity between popular and compact autos is positive, although not
precisely estimated. As expected with quarterly data, the estimated serial
correlation parameter (of 0.47) is positive and significantly different from
zero.
Implications of the Estimates. These estimates imply a large
effect of price decreases and of increases in national income. Post free-38
trade demand will depend on aspects of the industry which we have not
addressed (such as production parameters and the nature of competition)
and on the details of the free trade agreements. We will therefore present
estimates of demand under several hypotheses about prices and income.
Hunter, Markusen and Rutherford (1991) note that producers may
price discriminate across different countries if consumers are not allowed to
trade across borders (and thereby arbitrage away any price differentials.)
They suggest that, depending on the terms of the free trade agreement, this
may limit any decline in Mexican prices. However, the own-price demand
elasticities estimated here are considerably higher than the unit elasticities
assumed by these authors; this will limit the size of producer markups and
thus limit the size of price differentials across countries.
Table 12 presents results for predicted unit quarterly sales under
different scenarios. The first row of the table gives actual 4th quarter of
1990 sales. The second and third rows of the table consider the effect of a
decrease in prices to US levels. For thepurposes of these policy
experiments, we use prices which approximate the prices of similar
automobiles sold in the US, $8,000 for 'populars', $12,000 for compacts
and $18,000 for large and sporty cars. The second row assumes that the
Mexican government retains tariffs and taxes sufficient to raise Mexican
prices 20% above US levels, while the third row assumes that prices fall to
match their US counterparts. We see that a price decrease to US levels
more than doubles total Mexican demand.
Jncreases in Mexican GDP will further increase demand. Rows
four and five of the table present two scenarios. The first is that GDP
continues to grow at recent rates of about 3 %per year for five years. The
second is that the free trade agreement accelerates growth to 5 %per year39
for five years. Of course, the effects of such a large increase in GDPare
difficult tomeasureprecisely, as indicated by the large standard error of
estimated demand in the last row. However, the point estimatessuggest
that under the optimistic assumptions of 5%growthand US prices,
Mexican demand could reach more than 7 times its present level. Even the
relatively conservative estimates in the third row imply total aimual sales in
excess of 1.6 million, which is roughly 15% of US annual demand. This
may be a reasonable number for a country with a population one third the
population of the US However, the standard errors of these estimates
indicate a wide range of possible outcomes.
Some Caveats and Possible Extensions. The analysis of the
preceding section could be improved in several directions. The constant
elasticity demand framework is relatively simple and could be extended to
consider product level information in the manner of Berry, Levinsohu and
Pakes (1991). In an application to the US auto industry, that paper shows
how to combine explicit models of consumer utility with product level
variables to estimate a much richer set of cross-price elasticities. The lack
of attention to product level detail has possible empirical implications; for
example, we may underestimate demand increases by leaving out the effect
of increases in product variety.
The framework of the present paper does not distinguish consumer
perceptions of short versus long run changes in GDP and prices; adding
this distinction would be quite difficult, but could alter interpretations of the
income elasticity parameter. A related point is that we have not modelled
the durable nature of automobiles, which implies that past sales influence40
current demand. Also, the policy experiments of the last section do not
attempt to solve out for a new pricing equilibrium, but rather assume that
current North American price levels will prevail. This assumption becomes
less realistic as the Mexican market increases in size and is problematic if
producers are allowed to price discriminate across countries. Once again,
the methods of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1991) could be used to solve
out for new pricing equilibria with and without price discrimination.
The demand analysis of this section makes no attempt to estimate
the location of the plants which will service the growing Mexican market.
While some new plants may locate in Mexico to produce models which
have particular appeal in Mexico, we should note that apart from the VW
Beetle the models currently produced and sold in Mexico are very similar to
other North American models. Therefore, much if not most of the
increased Mexican demand could be served from plants which serve the
overall North American market. As we argue above, if these plants were
likely to move en masse to Mexico, they would have done so already.
Finally, we should comment briefly on the possible role of used
automobiles. If free trade in used cars is permitted, the relatively poor
Mexican consumers would become a major source of dethand for used cars
from the US and Canada. This would substantially drive up the price of
used cars and lead wealthier consumers (in all countries) to trade in their
old cars more frequently. In this case a more complicated trading pattern
might emerge, with the increase in North American demand for new cars
coming largely from US and Canadian consumers, while a large portion of
Mexican demand is satisfied by used cars. A large supply of recent vintage
used cars could easily supplant any new vehicle production geared expressly
for the low-priced Mexican market, particularly the VW Beetle. However,41
as noted, free-trade in used cars need not fundamentally alter our
conclusion of a large increase in North American sales, butonly the
distribution of new cars sales across differentgroups.
V. Conclusion.
We have argued that well-established exporting activities, withhigh
levels of technology, product quality and productivity, arelikely to remain
on both sides of the border. On the Mexican side, this sector will probably
be formed by the engine plants, the high-tech assembly plants, the US-
Mexican joint ventures in auto parts and a few other autopasts producers
with high efficiency levels. The maquiladora industry in Mexico will
continue to provide a useful cost reducing mechanism for all North-
American based plants, although their current justification, avoiding tariffs,
is likely to disappear under a Free Trade Agreement. Highly labor
intensive components will continue to be produced in plants similar to
current operations.
There are several factors that make Mexican production difficult, which
explains why most production activities will not simply move to 'the other
side'. Mexico's industrial infrastructure is weak in several areas. There is
a shortage of suppliers of maintenance parts, which increases the risk of a
partial halt in operations for long periods. Transportation systems, such as
rail and highways are still unreliable, disrupting supply lines and final
product delivery. Skilled labor is not abundant, at least in the medium run,
and additional training will be required for some tasks.
Mexico's role for the US automobile industry could involve the42
opening of production activities of small models that compete directly with
the large number of similar cars imported from Japan or East Asia,
sometimes even by Ford or General Motors themselves (Kia, Geo). The
benefit from this strategy consists in the additional sourcing of components
with high percentages (close to 80 percent) from the US itself. Ford's
restructuring of its Hermosillo plant points in this direction. Most
importantly, Mexico, as Canada with the implementation of the Auto-Pact,
offers the opportunity for production diversification and rationalization.
Finally, the dynamics of the domestic Mexican market itself,
expected to reach 1.5 million units of annual sales in 6 to 10 years,
represents an important possibility for export growth from US-based plants.
As Canada did in the sixties, Mexico could offer the opportunity for the
creation of a large new market just next door.43
Appendix
The model defined by equations (1) and (2)can be rewritten in




Notethat the model parameters are 0(j3,t,p)where ttisa vector with up
to nine elements. Estimation is based on the moment condition
E(vjq,xp,O) / z) —0,
where z is the seven vector of instruments discussed in thetext. We
simplify our use of instruments by first regressing observed prices on the
seven instruments and creating predicted prices from the estimated
coefficients. These predicted prices, ,wouldbe the optimal instruments
for the elasticities if expected value of price, conditionalon z, were linear
and if the p's were i.i.d. (see White, 1984). Inany case, they will provide
consistent and asymptotically normal estimates. Let the constructed
instrument vector be
We then choose the value of the parameters which minimizes the sample44
correlation between the errors and the instruments. The objective function
is therefore
m14 —v,(q,.x1p,O)®2
Theasymptotic variance, V(O), of the resulting estimator is standard from
White (1984).
The outcome of each of the "experiments" in table 12 can be
written as the linear combination of the estimated parameters
for some 5. The variance of the estimator of log quantity is therefore
1n(41= 111(q) + 60.
Vw(In(4)) —Ô'PjO)6.
By the usual first-order expansion, the variance of the predicted quantity is
Vas(4)4VarØn(4)).45
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MCXICAIlACED PASSLUCII CM ?.tIa F09 OGIESTIC SALES £10 (*PUTS

































































182,904 1,129 134,761 46,23277.41
241,882 0 192,133 41,395
259,366 1,129 136,202121,644
92,1392,676 22,245 74,312
4,504 0 5,431 0
1968 WOO MJIE1l aILSCT)p.) Proáxtla, 'Ott D*tic CApon. Prcd,ction Ttt. Pot; Vo.tic Upon. kin US Cl) IcOn US CII






























4,815 32,001 66,36197.01 134,591 941
40.449 4,060 36,3.85 0
15,024
9,012 9,152 3 13,676
2,016 2,050 45.073lit
313
13,762 36,38899.71 73,775 1,101
71,201 60,247 ¶2,319 4,450
119
60,741 12,3190.01 4,450 557 80,502 46,737 0.0%
TOTAl. 151,154 396,093 3,803 354,016249,92116.01




SOaa: MIA, i.vtrei il;taj.Table 4
AUTOIOTIVE MAAJILADAIMD4JSTRT. 1979-1988
I TQANSPQRTATIOII EJIPNENT
TRAJISP.EQtJip I kATJow*i_ TOTAL TEAl Plant.Worker. Tuported VaLue Exportedv.*.i V.A./ Worker. ValueExported Xrçuc, Added Valuelav.lrcut.Exp.V.lue Added Value (Nut In of VU) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1980 53 7,500 62.2 -- -- 6.3% 8.1% 1981 44 10,999 -- 125.5 -. -- 8.4% 13.0% 1982 44 12,288 -- 130.7 -.
9.7% 17.0% -- 1983 47 19,048 171.8 -- -- 12.8% 21.1%-- 1984 51 29,079 222.8 -- -- -- 14.6% 19.4% 1985 62 39,848-- 329.51,438.8 -- 22.92 18.8% 26.02 28.2% 1986 76 48,140 1,313.9 307.9 1,621.8 23.4% 19.0% 19.6% 23.8% 28.7% 1967 107 59,278 1,704.5 381.62,082.2 22.4% 18.3% 19.4% 23.9% 29.3% 1988 131 83,2902,253.5 596.32,849.8 26.5% 20.9% 21.4% 25,5% 28.1% 1989 149 87,8132,664.2 725.13,389.3 27.2% 21.4% 20.1% 23.8% 27.1% 1990 187 100,461 2,989.2 908.33,897.5 30.4% 23.3% 22.5% 25.2% 27.7%
—— •._n.. s_a....... 5.
SOaCE: INEGI and Banco de Mexico, several issues.Wira Warn.....
Oth.r Electrical Cci'çonanti
ladle recaivers
$•at Covart Interior 1,1. I Pert.
Sat I.lts
Plastic part. & bard.
04 gi.si
AirCacitinri & Air Cee..or,
kr.& lodyParts
R.t.ILlc Stnxtures for trel Len
body repair. a,4 Iiicetlona
0011 Cats
Ieconstnxtion of Perti




Anly of Cesr boin
Asa1y of •Ltainln p.rte
Cretecot.nt. aiffler.
oilier ...tt cpon.nt. Il
ei.aC*
OF














































U.S. USHEXiCO 2/ MEXICO OIlIER
(above 90%) lOLL' YENTURIS (above 50%) ILATIOWI
34 2 5 2 (Japan)
I. 4 ¶ (Jap.*es)
2 1 (Pn)




4 1 I l(US-Jep)










Ill 10 43 S
64.5% 5.52 25.01 4.7%
TOTAL ¶72 160 12
93.02 7.0%
lot..:
ml. refLect. a .urny of ISO Tr.n.port.t Ia Eqjlpaent Il.qail.dor...)erewe wily include those enqagS in
.uttIv. reLated activities.
1/ It Include. Cl )Speedters; (I )C.raIc llaynts; (I) CataLytic C04iverl.re; (2) il.t.Ltic c.nte;
Cl) Transmission Cwpoe'e,ts; (I) Wiraitield Viper..
2/ With US percentage oinersJ,ip beloW 90% bt above SO X.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hG TIWEE 21 53,509 0.2% 20.9% 19.1%
WIre Harness.. 14 29,458 0.5% 27.7% 72.3%
S..tCovers,Vtnytbo.rds 5 9.336 0.0% 28.51 11.5%
£ interior Trt.
GasoLineIny.ctors I I 2,931 0.0% 23.5% 76.5%
EngineControL.
&.dlo. I 4,137 0.0% 4.8% 95.2%
Stzprs I 1,224 2.3% 58.2% 41.8%
C.r.aic N.gn.ts I 711 0.0% 904X 9.4%
WIMQIm, GL.ss I 380 1.0% 60.81 39.2%
Cheat. Controls £ Radistor. 1 1,301 0.0% 22.5% 17.51
Staring CoLu,ns I 2,764 0.1% 14.5% 85.5%
Cat.Lytic Converter. I 1.207 0.0% 61.0% 39.0%
U.5. JOIST WHITURES
LEA-USA: I.taLLic Structures I 6 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
GERMAIIT-USA: PLastic •prings I 53 0.4% 4.41 95.6%
OTHER CaDITRIES
JAPAi:
Wire Harness.. 2 4,381 0.2% 59.51 40.5%
iHA.Sast Covers S sody parts 1 236 27.9% 48.11 51.9%
JAP-MU ElectricaL Con.nta I 52 1.7% 80.7% 19.3%
PAILMA:
Cassete PLayers 1 13 0.0% 1.2% 96.8%
Speed Coant.rs I 44 0.0% 54.3% 45.7%
CAMACA: Leather wheeL covers 1 663 0.4% 21.0% 79.0%
TOTAl. OF W!PLE 58,957 0.3% 22.0% 78.0%
a. a.... aaana.naa.a.n...s a. e...aana.aS
Notes:
Tot.L Pro&.ctlon VaLue ii defineda.the a of Value Aed pLus Isçort.d Conents. II It incti4e. Mczic.n Cwn.nt..















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parts in Chapter 87 (Autoinobiles)
Boards,seats& interior trim
CHAS!S & BtCIES
ENGINE COMPONENTS & PARTS




COMPONENTS USED IN PARTS PRWUCTION 71.6% 73.0%
Liquids,gtass,metat parts,wheets,etc.. 72.3% 72.5%
Engines,baits,fitters,mechanicat systeus 70.9% 72.4%









PASSANGER VEHICLES 99.4% 87.9%
TRUCKS 90.5% 98.5%
SPECIAL VEHICLES 96.7% 64.8%
SQJRCE: Data Base provided by SECOFI fran the US Tariff System.Table 10
OLSDemand Results, by type
DependentVariable is: in Qty
<Standard Errors in Parentheses)
POPULARCOMPACT LUXURY
Const 2.14 -6.60 2.07
(2.32) (4.13) (4.02)
LnCDP 2.60 4.14 2.95
(0.64) (1.12) (1.13)
Rate -0.75 -1.01 -0.89
(0.14) (0.21) (0.23)
LnPrice -0.67 -0.45 -1.08
(0.21) (0.27) (0.29)
R-SQ 0.63 0.52 0.59Table 11
Demand System Results
Instrumental Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
POPULAR COMPACT LUXURY
Const 3.30 -5.69 -2.64
(4.81) (5.05) (4.29)
1nGDP 3.40 3.98 4.55
(1.33) (1.51) (1.26)










Actual and Projected Mexican Auto Sales
(standard errors in paentheses)
POPULAR COMPACT LUXURY TOTAL
Actual 4th QTR 53,027 24,263 7,964 85,254 1990 Sales
U.S. Prices + 98,458 50,302 27,422 176,182 20% Tariff (36,678) (21,183) (13,949) (56,642)
U.S. Prices 139,093 54,644 37,432 231,169 No Tariff (66,743) (28,742) (23,833) (95,976)
5 Yrs 3% Growth 239,141 103,091 77,266 419,497
(U.S. Prices) (161,916) (78,008) (64,230) (245,933)
5 Yrs 3% Growth 356,080 164,338 131,587 652,004
(U.S. Prices) (297,019) (154,184) (130,084) (468,290)